Chinese Law and Politics Blog

Data on Rapid Increase of Mainland Chinese Students at U.S. Colleges

Numbers of mainland Chinese students at U.S. colleges and universities have increased 400% over the past seven years, according to an article in Inside Higher Education.

Year         Number of PRC students   % change from prior year

2012-13   235,597                                 21.4
2011-12   194,029                                 23.1
2010-11   157,558                                 23.5
2009-10   127,628                                 29.9
2008-9      98,235                                  21.1
2007-8      81,127                                  19.8
2006-7      67,723                                    8.2
2005-6      62,582                                    0.1
2004-5      62,523                                    1.2
2003-4      61,765                                   -4.6

China's Higher Education Bubble - Caixin

The numbers of university graduates in China has exploded.

In 1997, 400,000 students graduated from four-year university programs. Today, Chinese schools produce more than 3 million per year. But employment rates at graduation have plunged. And remote suburbs of Beijing and Shanghai teem with underemployed graduates, crammed four to a room in substandard housing and eking out an existence, often financially supported by their parents, as sidewalk vendors.

The country faces a higher education bubble fueled by state investment.

What Direction for Legal Reform under Xi Jinping? - Jamestown China Brief

Hopes for reform in China have risen in recent weeks. Xi Jinping’s decision to make Shenzhen the site of his first formal inspection tour as party general secretary spurred predictions that he will seek to assume Deng Xiaoping’s mantle as an economic reformer (“Xi Jinping’s ‘Southern Tour’ Reignites Promises of Reform,”China Brief, December 14, 2012). Similarly, Xi’s speech regarding China’s need for the rule of law—given on the 30th anniversary of the 1982 constitution—gave rise to press speculation that he may pursue legal and political reform (South China Morning Post, December 13, 2012; AFP, December 4, 2012). 

Naturally, this comes against the background of a conservative turn against legal reform by Chinese leaders in recent years [1]. Since 2005, party authorities have cooled on the rule-of-law discourse that characterized the late 1990s and early 2000s. Party political campaigns have warned Chinese judges and courts against foreign legal norms. Public interest lawyers have been subjected to increased pressure, harassment and periodic disappearances or torture. Moreover, under the leadership of former party political-legal committee head and standing committee member, Zhou Yongkang, extralegal “stability maintenance” (weiwen) institutions have ballooned in size and influence. 

New language in official pronouncements now suggests Chinese leaders intend to reverse at least some of these policies. This appears to be linked directly to internal party efforts to curb the power of political-legal committees in the wake of the Bo Xilai scandal (“Year-End Questions on Political-Legal Reform,” China Brief, December 14, 2012). This shift has allowed activists some greater space to advocate for reforms to state practices, including the reeducation through labor (RETL) system. Central authorities, however, remain committed to maintaining party political control, rendering it unclear how far such legal reforms will be permitted to proceed. 

[The full article is available on the Jamestown Foundation China Brief website]  

Rule of Law in China: Past, Present, and Future - The Diplomat

The conclusion of the Gu Kailai trial recently prompted an outpouring of interest in what the case might signal for the direction of rule of law and legal reform in China. 

As some have already pointed out, the answer is actually . . . nothing.  As is well known, the Chinese legal and political systems are deeply intertwined.  It therefore came as no surprise that a high-profile murder trial involving the wife of a former Politburo member was almost certainly decided at the top levels of Chinese Communist Party long before the case was brought before a judge. Indeed, it would have been surprising if it had been otherwise.

Instead, the critical rule-of-law story in China is a different one.  Specifically - the trend of recent years in which central authorities have turned against legal reforms they themselves had launched at the end of the 20^th century - reforms that emphasized the roles of law, lawyers, and courts in resolving a wide range of ordinary citizens’ grievances, and in helping in the daily governance of China- and whether this turn against law will continue under the new leadership.

[published in the Diplomat - full link here]

Chinese State Council White Papers and the "Turn Against Law”

In recent years, Chinese central authorities have turned against a range of legal reforms that they had pursued in the late 20^th century. They have de-emphasized judicial professionalization.  They have increased the harassment and abuse of public interest lawyers.  And since 2006, Party authorities have pursued “Socialist Rule of Law” political campaigns re-emphasizing Party supremacy and warning against the infiltration of “Western” rule-of-law concepts.   (For more on this, see here.)

Official Chinese rhetoric with regard to legal reform has also changed.  Comparing two State Council White Papers - China’s Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law (2008) and the Socialist Legal System With Chinese Characteristics (2011) illustrates this shift.

The Chinese Bar Exam and the “Turn Against Law”

In recent years, Chinese central authorities have turned against a range of legal reforms that they had pursued in the late 20^th century – a professional judiciary, resolving administrative and civil disputes through court trials, and so on. (For more on this, see here.)

These reflect deeper shifts in political winds blowing from the top of the system.  Starting in 2006, Party authorities launched “Socialist Rule of Law” political campaigns re-emphasizing Party supremacy and warning against the infiltration of “Western” rule-of-law concepts.  These new ideological efforts have become a regular feature within Chinese courts and other legal institutions, reflected in new materials for judges to review in internal political study sessions.

Changed state attitudes have shown up in another venue as well – namely, the national judicial examination (sifa kaoshi). 

"Stability Maintenance," Mediation, and Chinese Hospitals

Official “stability maintenance” (weiwen) efforts in China have created pressures on local authorities to hold down citizen discontent and protests at all costs. This has also created markets for people capable of filling this role – the hiring of informally recruited security forces (or more simply - “goons”) by some local authorities being one example.

The May 31 edition of the Southern Weekend has an article on another element of this dynamic - the emergence of private firms who handle security/dispute resolution efforts in Chinese hospitals, all under the rubric of “mediation.”

Position: Professional Staff Member, Congressional Executive Commission on China (CECC)

The CECC is seeking professional staff members to assist in monitoring and reporting on substantive issues, including worker rights, criminal justice, freedom of residence and movement, access to justice, Xinjiang, ethnic minority rights, freedom of religion, civil society, North Korean Refugees in China, and property in China. Staff members will be based in Washington, DC.

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China is a bipartisan commission created by Congress in 2000 to monitor and report on human rights and rule of law developments in China. The Commission consists of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and senior officials from the Administration. The Commission holds hearings, issues an Annual Report, and maintains a database of political prisoners in China, among other activities. For more information on the Commission, see www.cecc.gov.

Program Officer Position: UNDP, Beijing

The United Nations Development Programme is seeking to fill a programme analyst position in Beijing, focusing on the areas of civil society development, access to justice and legal empowerment.  Deadline is February 25.  Open to Chinese nationals only. 

See here for more information.

 

Party Policies on Culture Continue to Play Out

None of the recent developments such as the restrictions on TV programming, the real-name registration efforts for microblogs, the crackdown on illegal publications and pornography, or Hu Jintao’s article in Seeking Truth, came out of the blue. 

Rather, these are simply part of a comprehensive program set out in the Party plenum statement issued in October at the conclusion of the 6^th plenum of the 17^th Central Committee (which itself simply pulls together yet earlier policy strands).  The plenum statement sets up a comprehensive plan with regard to culture that is being pushed through the system.  (Note that culture doesn’t just mean food festivals – we’re talking history textbooks, Internet content, TV programs, etc).