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December 03, 2007

What Explains the Decline in Reporting on Social Unrest in China?

In 2004, media reports on incidents of domestic social unrest in China were frequent and widespread.  Beginning in early 2005, official Chinese sources began to report significant declines in the numbers of both mass incidents and citizen petitionsAt the same time, media reports regarding incidents of social unrest tapered off.

Official Chinese sources attribute these developments to official success in resolving citizen grievances.  But there is another possible explanation: official directives issued during this period that ban media coverage of mass incidents.

For example, article 21 of the joint 2005 Shenzhen Party and government notice regarding the implementation of the local response measures to mass incidents clearly states "mass incidents are in principle not to be openly reported on." Similarly, article 3.4(1) of the 2005 Jiujiang municipal response plan for large-scale mass incidents similarly states that "large-scale mass incidents are generally not to be reported on."

Now, tracking back the source for many of these local response plans, one quickly hits upon a 2003 central Party document – "Notice of the General Offices of the Communist Party Central Committee and State Council Regarding Improving and Strengthening the Work of Media Reporting on Emergency Incidents," [中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅关于进一步改进和加强国内突发事件新闻报道工作的通知(中办发[2003]22号)]. I haven't been able to find the text of this document. But various local plans seem to link the prohibition on media reporting with this central document, suggesting it may include a specific ban.

Indeed, Central Chinese authorities made efforts to enact a prohibition on such reporting into national law. The original draft of the "Emergency Response Law" (突发事件应对法)introduced in 2006 included a clause imposing fines of up to 100,000 yuan on news media outlets that "independently reported" on public emergencies such as natural disasters, industrial accidents, health emergencies, and public order crises (i.e. mass incidents). At least partially as a result of popular pressure, this clause was removed in the final version of the law passed on August 30, 2007. 

So, at roughly the same time as one sees a flurry of media reports regarding social unrest, you also see a central Party directive issued regarding media reporting on such incidents, followed in the following year or two by local authorities adopting "emergency response plans" that bar reporting on them. And then media reports dry up. It's at least somewhat suggestive of a cause-and-effect relationship . . . .

However, I'm still a little uncertain about concluding that a ban in the 2003 central government notice is the sole explanation for a decline in reports of social unrest starting in 2005. Would it actually take a year and a half for a central Party directive restricting media reporting on social unrest to take effect? On other issues (such as shifts in the reporting of SARS), central directives seem to go into effect much faster. I would definitely be interested in the thoughts of others on this issue.

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Since there's been changing definitions of what a mass incident is in the first place, isn't it possible they've narrowed the definition, hence fewer reports? ESWN previously wrote on how the definition shifted more than once.

Or another possibility: were there more incentives (chance for promotion, funds) for local officials to report disturbances in 2004 that later dried up or were replaced by disincentives (demotion, etc.)?

Can we be sure the numbers accurately reflected anything to begin with?

It’s an interesting question. I think both the 2003 directive and various “emergency response plans” were part of a much broader public security effort, which included the staffing of paramilitary riot reponse teams in major cities and the tightening of civil society control. This was generally interpreted to be part of a broad effort to avoid a “color” revolution. I was working at a foreign and domestic-supported NGO in Beijing in 2005 and the Propaganda Dept. paid us a visit. They demanded that our website be rewritten and political articles be removed, or we'd be shut down. Around the same time, many other NGOs were reporting gov’t intimidation. The sad story of Nick Young was finally fully revealed yesterday: http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1204/p09s01-coop.html

The link between NGO’s and social unrest is the ability of NGO’s to develop community and linkages between groups. This is likely the most worrisome aspect of unrest, which until now has been localized. This is why Falun Dafa is so terrifying, and it is also probably why the anti-Japanese protests were allowed to proceed but then quickly doused before they spread too far.

The government retrenched in poor areas because policy was to support money-making ventures in wealthy areas. This left an administrative void for NGO’s to fill. Well, they filled it but then became influential and developed too many links to international civil society. Especially worrisome were NGOs in places like Xinjiang, which is both poor and has an active separatist movement. Remember that during that famous Taishi (Guangzhou) protest in 2005, the villagers were really savvy, contacting Knight-Ridder Newspapers and international groups before they even encountered serious police trouble. That protest made the NY Times and embarrassed the government.


In response to other comment, I think you are right, they have narrowed the definition. But it's strange that they would even admit so many mass incidents in the first place only to suddenly reverse course. It's possible that they realized so much international attention towards social instability in the country might be bad for business.

See also the recent article in Hong Kong's Yazhou Zhoukan from November 18 2007, which describes how the journal Min Jian was recently shut down by authorities because it advocated NGO's, free speech and civil society. According to the article, there was a major campaign ahead of the 17th Congress and now the Beijing Olympics to silence obstacles to uniform public opinion.

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  • Carl Minzner
    Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law in St. Louis
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